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CONFERENCE
Fifth International
Conference on Philosophy in Practice
27-30 July 1999
Wadham College, Oxford University, Britain
The SPP hosted the highly succesful Fifth International Conference
on Philosophy in Practice. To find out about the conference you can
read:
Conference Aims - what did the conference set out
to achieve?
Abstracts of papers, presentations and dialogues
- full abstracts of the conference contents
Full conference Papers - a sample of papers presented
Report of the conference - what some of the delegates
and organisers thought and felt about the experience
Or you can buy the book
, 'thinking through dialogue', based on the conference proceedings
CONFERENCE AIMS
Thinking Through Dialogue
" Increasingly philosophers earn
their living as consultants. This conference
will explore the practical role of philosophical dialogue in
counselling, education and business organisations, and aims to enrich
the international dialogue between practising philosophers."
The conference will embrace three
areas of practice:
ABSTRACTS
OF PAPERS AND WORKSHOPS
This is a sample of the abstracts for the conference sessions.
All abstracts and papers are copyright of the original authors
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AUTHOR
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TITLE
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Avshalom Adam
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Harriet Chamberlain
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Vaughana Macy Feary
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Antti Mattila, M.D.
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Barbara Stecker and Pierre Grimes
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Dona Warren
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Mason Marshall and Thomas Buford
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Eulalia Bosch
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Emmy van Deurzen
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Hans Bolten
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Karin Muriss and
Joanna Haynes
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Jos Delnoij
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Henning Herrestad
and others
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Eite Veening
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Eite Veening
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Shlomit C. Schuster
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Jean-Luc Thill
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Roger Sutcliffe
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Richard Anthone
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David Arnaud
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Jon Borowicz
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Ida Jongsma And Dorine Bauduin
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Warren Shibles
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Wieger Van Dalen
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Nigel W Laurie
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PAPERS
This is a sample of the full papers from the conference.
Full papers for the conference can be obtained from the Proceeding of
the 1999 Conference on Philosophy in Practice, published by the Practical
Philosophy Press
AUTHOR
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ARTICLE
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Trevor Curnow
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Tim LeBon
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CONFERENCE REPORT
Conference Reflections published in Practical Philosophy (Volume
2, No 3, November 1999)
Read the reflections of:
Two Conference Old-Timers
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Dries Boele
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Two Conference First-Timers
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Ted Walch
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Two Conference Organisers
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Avshalom Adam
Progress and Logic of Questions
A critical examination of the question of good life is an old undone
business of philosophy. Taking back this business to the market and
marketing it to the people, as philosophical counselling services, is
a major aim of philosophical practice. In the market it is offered as
a complementary alternative to psychotherapy and religious practices,
as such it is in the realm of applied philosophy. What methodology is
employed by the (open) society of consultant philosophers? What are
the limits of this methodology? In which ways can philosophers assist
their fellow humans? To be more specific, what is the logic of philosophical
practice, if it has any? Like in philosophy or in history or in science,
it is the logic of questions and answers. For all explanations are answers
to a variety of sets of questions. One needs to know, what is the question
(or set of questions) asked by the person who asks for philosophical
counselling. Then, formulation and reformulation of the questions and
the alternative answers may crystallise the agenda of the practice.
With this the heuristic and the scope of a discourse is always given:
a question its presuppositions, and its range of answers. To illustrate,
a typical question is the choice of one’s style of living. The alternative
set of answers may be examined vis-à-vis the criteria of choices
of style of living.
In this practice a progress may
be examined. The criteria of progress in philosophical practice are
a function of the changes made in the critical examination of the questions
and answers. Every question rests on presuppositions or assertions.
I suggest the following concept of progress in philosophical practice.
The formulation of questions and the move from an old question to a
new question is progressive, if and only if, the old question rested
on uncritical assertions, some defective ones. Once the assertions were
criticised, a new question was formulated and if it was not based on
the same set of assertions, this move is considered a progress. This
is a negative notion of progress cognates to the Socratic concept of
knowledge. The progress made is relative to the changes in the frame
of references of the discourse. In a sense it is a welcome progress
since some unwarranted assertions were exposed as defective.
Harriet Chamberlain
Philosophical Counselling: A Dialogue in Critical Thinking
There is a definite relationship
between our Post-modern world and the need for counselling. The world
we have created has intensified the stress on our minds and bodies.
Relativism, both moral and cognitive invite more freedom to choose,
but weaken the influence of traditional structures for guidance. There
is, therefore, ever more need for individual, independently determined
beliefs, values, mores, meaning and purpose. This situation burdens
each of us with the responsibility for making increasing numbers of
life choices on a daily basis. We are coerced into taking on the responsibilities
of our existential freedom to choose. But where shall we find the criteria
for choosing?
Critical Thinking, once thought
an exercise appropriate only within the walls of academia, now has a
role to play in our everyday lives. It provides a foundation, structure,
and guidelines for helping individuals to determine their life choices,
based upon their own creation of a world view. The critical thinking
dialogue, using Socratic questioning techniques, is directed toward
self-examination and self-reflection that engenders enhanced coping
abilities. Its goal is to support counsellees in their efforts to integrate
their most deeply-held beliefs, values, sense of purpose and meaning
with their actions on a daily basis: Realisation of a freely determined
world view.
The use of Critical Thinking necessarily
includes an understanding of the influence of emotion, memory, and intuition
on our reasoning faculties. Anyone familiar with recent brain research
is aware of the interplay between all forms of mental events and must
include them in the dialogue as material for examination and reflection.
Critical Thinking necessitates
the development of creative thinking as well as intellectual and emotional
predispositions toward empathy, fairness, humility, perseverance, faith
in reason, and so on. These practices, applied toward the enhancement
of the quality of life and preservation of universal respect and dignity
for all human beings, can make a positive difference in the world.
It is my firm belief that Philosophical
Counselling, and the work of Critical Thinking inherent in that practice,
has a positive contribution to make, not only to the discipline itself
and to those who seek it, but to the larger issues that threaten our
mental and physical well being, including survival of our species.
Vaughana Macy
Feary
Dialogue & multi-cultural issues
This workshop will provide
participants with opportunities to develop strategies for doing philosophical
counselling with minority clients, in individual and group settings,
and for addressing the diversity problems of organisations from philosophical
perspectives. Participants should read the three case descriptions at
the conclusion of my paper in the Proceedings. All three case descriptions
are taken from my philosophical work in correctional settings. The first
case involves individual counselling with a male African American offender.
The second case involves group counselling with Latina female offenders.
The third case involves diversity training for custody staff of a correctional
facility under suit for discrimination against women and minority staff.
Through dialogue, participants will have opportunities to develop and
enrich their multi-cultural counselling competencies and to consider
how Charles Taylor's " demands for recognition", which are discussed
in my paper, can be satisfied in these cases.
Handouts on multicultural counselling
skills, as well as useful bibliographies about multicultural philosophical
traditions, will be provided. Participants are encouraged to bring handouts
of their own to share with us. Participants will also have opportunities
to examine and discuss a series of photographs I use in stimulating
philosophical discussion with resistant clients or clients with limited
English. The photographs, I now refer to as the "Hypatia Series" consist
of emblematic objects arranged in small rooms. Some were arranged by
me; some are arrangements made by women offenders to illustrate their
own issues, or their understanding of feminist philosophical issues
we have discussed in group.
Antti Mattila,
M.D.
Cultivating The Flexible Mind: Epictetus And Reframing
This paper explores some of the
similarities between the "spiritual exercises" recommended by the stoic
philosopher Epictetus and the psychotherapeutic technique of reframing
widely used in family and systemic therapies. Similarities are so extensive
that Epictetus could be called the father of reframing. In conclusion
it will be argued that the ability to use reframing, to see thing in
a new light, is needed in most areas of life. The cultivation of such
ability – mental flexibility – should be part of our elementary education.
Barbara Stecker,
M.A. and Pierre Grimes, Ph.D.
Symmetry and the Origin of the Pathologos in Philosophical Midwifery
The adaptation of Socratic dialogue by Pierre Grimes
as a exploratory tool for the understanding and eradication of false
beliefs is modelled on the maieutic dialogue of Plato’s Theaetetus.
In both the adaptation and in Plato the goals are similar in that they
both bring to birth the unreflective beliefs of the subject but the
difference from the Platonic lies in the discovery of a new kind of
belief which is not only unknown to the believer but one that is irreconcilable
with one’s most personally meaningful goals. This newly identified member
in the class of belief it is called the pathologos and its adaptation
as a therapy is called philosophical midwifery. The implications of
Dr. Grimes’ work (1) has far reaching implications on philosophy, psychology,
teaching, critical thinking, and research into cognitive processes.
The false beliefs, the pathologos, were formed
from early scenes of childhood that provided the conditions for the
subject to conclude about themselves falsely. It was when the subject
was open, receptive, and pursuing their own personal way of being that
the parent-authorities indicated, most convincingly and sincerely, that
this present state was not to be tolerated. Therefore when subjects
experience an opportunity to seek goals that reflect their
own personal way of being they face the past conclusions
that they should avoid such goals. For under similar circumstances we,
unreflectively, expect similar results and so we act out accordingly,
repeating again and again a formula that effectively blocks or diminishes
the attainment of our highest goals.
The past lessons are superimposed upon the present,
the inner thoughts and feeling states preserve and communicate the lessons
drawn from the past. For a model created in the past is imposed upon
the present so that the present loses its reality and the subject, unknowingly,
lives out a fiction as if the present is a mirror of the past. The participation
in the pathologos remains in force until the reasons for its existence
are discovered and confirmed in one’s experience.
Thus there is, in this imposition of the pathologos,
a symmetry between the past and the present. The pathologos itself has
a pseudo-existence, since as a fiction it has a power and activity akin
to the Platonic doctrine of forms but cannot survive its disclosure.
If this paper is accepted, I will introduce the
ideas of Philosophical Midwifery in a slide presentation and follow
it with my talk. I am also prepared to offer a work-shop demonstration
of PM if a subject volunteers for such an exploration. I also have several
professional videos of midwifery sessions that could be excerpted to
be shown with the paper.
1 P. Grimes and R. Uliana Philosophical Midwifery:
A New Paradigm for Understanding Human Problems, Hyparxis Press,
Costa Mesa California, 1998
Dona Warren
Healing Thrasymachus: the Psychotherapeutic use of Dialogue
Adlerian therapy, rational emotive behavior therapy, and cognitive therapy
are united in maintaining that emotions are caused by our introspectively-accessible
thoughts, that emotional disturbances are generated by epistemologically
defective cognitions, that we can change our emotions by changing our
thoughts and that we can overcome emotional disturbances by learning
to think more rationally. In view of their emphasis on cognition, I
call these psychotherapies "noetic therapies."
In addition to the previous four assumptions,
all of which are pretty explicitly held by schools of noetic therapy,
noetic therapists implicitly adopt two other presuppositions in the
course of explicating what it means to think more rationally. Specifically,
noetic therapists tacitly presuppose that a belief is justified if and
only if it conforms to empirical foundationalism (i.e. if and only if
it is either an experiential belief or else strongly inferable from
a set of experiential beliefs) and that, procedurally, in order to determine
whether or not a belief is justified, we must check that belief against
the relevant empirical facts. In short, in helping their patients to
think more rationally, most noetic therapists tacitly assume that they
may begin and end with teaching their patients to reason more scientifically.
These implicit assumptions about justification
are natural, given psychology’s historical identification with other
sciences, and they have much to recommend them. Philosophically, the
merits of foundationalism have been widely discussed, and psychologically,
the therapeutic methodology informed by empirical foundationalism is
probably sufficient to defuse a large class of emotionally maladaptive
beliefs. A patient’s conviction that others have behaved wrongly, for
example, may be coherently exposed to empirical disconfirmation simply
by demonstrating that the alleged behavior did not take place, and insofar
as that belief funds the patient’s anger, his mood may be lifted by
exposing its factual inaccuracy. Unfortunately, there are philosophical
and psychotherapeutic limitations to foundationalist empiricism. Philosophically,
this model of justification has been subject to well-grounded attack;
psychologically, empirically verifiable beliefs seldom if ever carry
the entire emotional charge. For instance, by noetic therapy’s own lights,
an angry patient’s mood is not triggered exclusively by his belief that
certain actions have taken place; in order to generate anger, this empirically
verifiable belief must be supplemented by some ancillary and non-empirical
conviction to the effect that such actions are unethical or wrong.
In view of the psychological importance
of such non-empirical beliefs, noetic therapy is faced with a choice
between maintaining its implicit allegiance to empirical foundationalism
on the one hand, consequently declaring these non-empirical beliefs
to be ipso facto unjustified, and abandoning empirical foundationalism
on the other. Although noetic therapy has tended to take the first option,
I argue that this approach to non-empirical beliefs is both philosophically
and psychotherapeutically unattractive. If it’s to deal effectively
with the full range of emotion-generating beliefs, noetic therapy must
relinquish its implicit adherence to foundationalist empiricism. In
its place, noetic therapy may profitably adopt a more inclusive epistemology,
maintaining that a belief is justified if and only if it either
conforms to the empirical foundationalist model of justification or
coheres with beliefs that do conform to empirical foundationalism. Procedurally,
this entails that merely checking a belief against the relevant empirical
facts will be insufficient to determine its epistemic status. Instead,
noetic therapy must incorporate more traditionally philosophical
methods of belief assessment, including a gentle variant of Socratic
dialogue. In short, in the process of helping their patients to think
more rationally, noetic therapists must teach their patients to reason
scientifically and philosophically. This, of course, will implicate
philosophy more intimately in the practice of noetic therapy, thereby
narrowing the gap between the nascent school philosophical Counselling
and a well-established and increasingly-influential class of psychotherapies.
Mason
Marshall and Thomas Buford
Toward PC for 'Mild Autism'
The thesis of this paper is that philosophical
counselling is relevant to ‘mild autistics’ and, in fact, preferable
to psychotherapy. Demonstrating this is vital to the future of philosophical
counselling. Unless proponents of philosophical counselling establish
its relevance to more than ‘normal’ people, philosophical counselling
may meet with toleration but never gain full credibility.
In clinical terms, ‘autism’ is a neurological
‘disorder’ rather than a ‘psychopathology.’ For physicians and
psychologists, it (essentially) is marked by (1) deficits with language
and/or non-verbal communication, (2) chronic difficulty understanding
other people and grasping social interactions, and (3) ‘impairments
of imagination.’ While so-called ‘low-functioning autistics’ can seem
wholly inaccessible, ‘mild autistics’ can become relatively well adapted
(to ‘normal’ society) and achieve remarkable success despite their ‘disabilities.’
Psychiatry and psychology can be of use to ‘mild
autistics.’ But clinical ‘treatments’ tend to dehumanise and subjugate
them. By contrast, philosophical counselling would enrich and empower
the ‘mild autistic.’
Not only could philosophical counselling profit
‘mild autistics,’ but, as counsellees, they would benefit it.
It stands to gain by showing its relevance to more than ‘normal’ people,
and ‘mild autistics’ form the most ‘abnormal’ group that can philosophise.
Despite their difficulty grasping concepts, ‘mild autistics’ could think
philosophically through the use of imagination. Their imagination
impairments are surmountable since they are merely contingent on circumstances
rather than inherent to ‘mild autism.’
A case-study of one twenty-two year old ‘mild autistic,’
whom we call Ken, suggests that the counselling philosopher (CP) could
understand ‘mild autistics’ through philosophy and equip them to make
richer sense of themselves and their worlds. Of Ken’s many, complex
concerns, five seem most central: he wants to account for (1) why he
sees violence where others do not, (2) why he remains intensely egocentric,
(3) why he fears and resents almost everyone, (4) why, to his dislike,
he fixates on ‘role-playing games,’ and, most important, (5) why his
schoolmates bullied him. The CP might begin by posing various philosophical
interpretations of Ken’s situation that could help him (philosophically)
diagnose himself. The philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas yields one
such interpretation. It suggests that Ken stays defenceless, egocentric,
fearful and resentful of others, ‘addicted’ to fantasy ultimately because
he has difficulty empathising with others.
While psychiatrists and psychologists presume that
‘mild autistics’ can scarcely empathise, the philosophy of Giambattista
Vico shows the contrary. Through metaphorical act of the imagination,
Ken could find empathy for his bullies. Thereby, he would grow closer
to having compassion for others, in general.
The prospect of philosophical counselling for ‘mild
autistics’ deserves support. Together through philosophy, counsellor
and ‘mild autistic’ could gain richer understandings of themselves and
their worlds, and more whole, meaningful lives.
Eulalia
Bosch:
A Philosophical Approach to Contemporary Art: looking out loud
Aesthetic perception, the perception of an object’s
artistic qualities, is an act of seduction. We see many things, as we
see many works of art, but we only look at some of them. We look at
those that have held our
undivided attention for a given moment, and have
generated an inner supplication, born within us and addressed to us,
a plea on behalf of further looking, listening, touching. This reflexive
and reflective
concern (reflexive, because it comes from within
us and returns to us; reflective, because the sensation continues through
the act of pondering) is what turns the perceptive act into an act of
intellectual
seduction. As a means of retaining the initial
impression a bit longer, we look frantically for a word, or perhaps
for a sound, that may hold inside us the impression we have experienced.
This vague linguistic
phenomenon - we usually exclaim a word or phrase
whose denotative import is of no immediate relevance- will be the first
step towards questioning ourselves about the work, thus prolonging the
time of
observation. Seduced via our senses, we begin to
enjoy the pleasure of unhurried contemplation; our apprehension of the
work meanders among well-known words, and we discover the voids that
this particular moment has generated among them.
Writing, painting, and sculpting are creative processes;
but the time has come to admit that reading, beholding a painting, and
facing that volume of sculpture also are creative processes. "Reading
is what really requires ‘genius’. Reading is what turns an abstract
possibility into a specific free action", says Gabriel Zaid in The Fair
of Progress. An unequivocal sign of viewer’s creativity is her or his
ability to behold a work of art with good taste and subtlety : this
is proof of a perceptive universe that may be widened and remade. For
art to be something other than a fiction where people are replaced by
cartoon characters, artists’ ability to imagine new universes must encounter
viewers’ desire to contemplate realities different from those of daily
life.
To re-create a work, to bring it back into the
present, one must have creative interests; in this field, adults reached
the goals they have chosen, whereas children are still on the starting
line. So, when the world loses its roundness to become flat, and becomes
round again, and we do not find this in the least shocking, then we
are in the process of acquiring the language of art. To look aloud is
a good way to learn. Looking aloud is a way of feeling that one’s creativity
is at stake, and that it is the differences between people that afford
us the chance to keep on beholding, to keep on feeling ourselves looking,
to gain ground on emotion or rejection.
Emmy van Deurzen
Speech is silver, silence is golden:
philosophical consultancy or psychotherapy?
Philosophical enquiry, two thousand
years ago, was used as an early form of psychotherapy. Yet present day
philosophical consultancy and psychotherapeutic intervention are often
worlds apart. Their objectives, methods and values are very different.
Their respective approaches to communication and intervention are dissimilar
as well. The dialogic and dialectical interventions of philosophy have
much to teach psychotherapists. The probing of subtext and hidden meaning
through silent interventions and interpretation are one of the assets
of psychotherapy. It is important to define the differences and similarities
between philosophical and psychotherapeutic intervention and to come
to some conclusions about the need to either define clear boundaries
or create a new form of co-operation and dialogue between the two disciplines.
The tradition of existential psychotherapy may provide a bridge between
the two continents. The discussion might explore whether such bridging
is desirable or not.
Hans Bolten
PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS IN ORGANISATIONS
More and more members of organisations
find themselves confronted with questions like: 'How should we co-operate
with one another?', 'How do we want to treat our clients?', 'How do
we want to be known publicly?' They are questions that revolve around
a question about identity: 'What kind of an organisation do we want
to be?' This is a question that deals with our ethical, social and even
metaphysical goals and ideas as they function within an organisation.
In the workshop we will look into the nature of such questions, do exercises
in formulating them meaningfully and explore manners to deal with them.
Karin Muriss
and Joanna Haynes Error, not Truth ?
We will start by watching a video
of children evaluating philosophical enquiry. Then we explore children's
participation in dialogue from an holistic philosophical perspective.
We are particularly interested in the practice of ‘changing one's mind'
and the value of learning from errors. Facilitators of philosophical
enquiry may need to pay particular attention to emotional/intellectual
dimensions of participation in an enquiry. Authentic dialogue involves
risk, exposure, and challenge. Once children sense that teachers
feel safe and genuinely recognise children's authority in dialogue,
the level of risk-taking increases and genuine shifts in thinking take
place. Philosophical enquiry becomes a real intellectual adventure.
We have noticed that young children
express changing their minds as an 'achievement'. They seem more interested
in the pleasurable feeling of surprise and revelation that can go with
changing one's mind, and less concerned about any notion of inconsistency,
revision of failure to ‘hold on’ to a position. This is another example
of the emotionally empowering features of philosophical enquiry and
the opportunities it provides for building resilience.
In short, we would like to explore
our experience of working with children and examine what children can
teach ‘us’ about achieving richness and complexity in dialogue through
an absence of self-consciousness. We will point to the necessity to
‘unlearn’ a lot we have learnt. We will be drawing on the ideas of Italian
philosopher Gemma Fiumara - who has inspired and informed our current
thinking.
Structure:
1. Watching a video of children
evaluating philosophical enquiry (text see below).
2. Listing questions the video
raises for us.
3. Inviting the audience to contribute.
4. Introducing Gemma Fiumara via
a short extract from one of her books, in order to shift the focus of
the discussion towards an exploration of the way in which language delineates
our thinking about dialogue.
Jos Delnoij
A Socratic dialogue
A Socratic dialogue is a joint attempt to find
the answer to a fundamental question. The question is the heart of the
dialogue. It is applied to a concrete experience of one of the participants,
which is made accessible to the others. In fact the Socratic dialogue
is a systematic reflection upon this experience.
In the dialogue we aim at consensus. It is possible
to achieve consensus, but this is not simple and easy. Effort, discipline
and perseverance are required from each and every participant. Thoughts
need to be clarified in such a way that everyone understands each other
exactly. Explanations and reasons are to be analysed and weighed carefully.
The dialogue moves slowly but systematically, so that all participants
have insight in the progress made.
Although Socratic dialogue derives its name from
Socrates, it is not an imitation of the dialogues as written by Plato.
What is basically ‘Socratic’ is the rigorous inquiry into thoughts,
concepts and values we hold for true. The Socratic dialogue is a joint
investigation into our assumptions when we make a certain statement.
Purpose
There is a growing interest in the Socratic way
of talking with each other. With this workshop we want to offer the
opportunity to experience what is means being involved in Socratic investigation.
Preparation
Those who would like to participate, are kindly
requested to prepare themselves in the following way:
Please select a concrete example, derived from
your own experience, in which the general question plays a major role.
Your example should meet the following criteria:
1. Your example has been derived from your own
experience. Generalised examples ("It happens quite often to me that...")
are not fit.
2. The examples is simple, not complicated.
3. The example is relevant to all other participants.
E.g. it is likely that they have had a similar experience.
4. The example deals with something that has been
finished.
5. You have taken a decision or made a judgement
yourself in this example.
6. You are willing and able to present the example
exhaustively and provide all the factual information that is relevant
for the other participants.
One of the examples will be chosen as the ‘working
material’ for the investigation.
Henning Herrestad and others
Educating Philosophical Counsellors
This paper presents the work of
the Oslo group in arranging a successful two year training program in
Philosophical Counselling. In a dialogue between a counsellor named
"Patricia" and Henning we are presented with Henning’s thoughts about
how to start your own training program, what are the important activities
in the program, what they learned in the Oslo group, why a special training
is necessary, and why Henning don’t believe in fixed curricula and exams
for such training programs.
Eite Veening
"How to love Sophia? In her old age,
in our New Age."
In this lecture I will discuss three related issues
that I consider to be of vital importance for our virtual community
of philosophical practicians in the next decade.
The first issue is the philosophical but also esoteric
virtue Wisdom and the fact that people hope to find just that by consulting
a philosopher.
The second issue is the obvious and fascinating
femininity of the mythical impersonation of wisdom, Sophia, and its
consequences for our "post-modern" culture.
The third issue is the possibility of a fundamental
but yet unappointed split in our community of consultant-philosophers
and my proposal to acknowledge two different (dialoging) "schools" in
philosophical counselling.
I will take a tentative position in these issues
and consider their relatedness; after the talk there will be time for
dialogue and discussion.
Eite Veening
DEAP; a method for Debating Ethical
Arguments among Professionals
In this workshop I will present and demonstrate
a method (that I developed over the last few years) to be used for debating
ethical issues in groups of professionals (social workers, therapists,
brokers, doctors etc.). The use of this method enlarges the chance of
a clear and relevant discussion and diminishes the risk of confusion.
It offers the participants a formal framework in which every opinion
of the participants can find a legitimate place, in which different
opinions can be compared and in which a debate on "the heart of the
matter" is made possible
Participants of this workshop will have the opportunity
to take the position of a debating professional (for example: a consultant-philosopher)
and/or to take the position of the conducting philosopher. The sessions
will close with a evaluative discussion on DEAP.
Shlomit C.
Schuster
Philosophical Counselling and Rationality.
Two recent articles in the International Journal
of Applied Philosophy state that philosophical counselling (PC) is very
similar to Albert Ellis' rational emotive therapy (RET), and that PC
should be made even more similar to RET. I first inquire how the writers
of these statements came to their conclusions and what they mean by
philosophical counselling (PC). I find that there are very few similarities
between RET and PC. Essential and obvious differences are found, for
example, in RET's and PC's goals and in the use of rationality. The
question "What is rationality" seems out of the question in RET practices:
RET therapists only foster their own rationale to their patients, who
have to be agreeable in order to progress in therapy. Rationality is
not a concept philosophically arrived at for the RET patient as well
as the RET therapist. On the contrary, philosophical counsellors understand
and may present different types of rationalities to their clients. Moreover,
they can reflect and discuss the irrational, not as something forbidden
or as coming from the unconscious, but as a respectable possibility
in human thought and action. Examples of different types of rationalities
will be presented. The practice of manifold rationalities in the lived
experience is illuminated through the Confessions of St. Augustine.
(c) 1999 S. C. Schuster, All rights reserved
Jean-Luc Thill
‘Thinking through Dialogue’ guided by creative writing and mind-mapping
‘Thinking through dialogue’ resumes one of the
most popular techniques dealt with in philosophical practice, whereas
writing has become a mere instrument in order to record this process.
This is at least the case for most of the Socratic dialogues and corporate
philosophical counselling sessions. However, writing has a lot more
to offer than simple backup functions. Hence the aim of this workshop
is to present two major ideas into philosophical counselling: creative
writing and mind-mapping.
The first part of the workshop will deal with mind-mapping.
After a direct confrontation with the subject-matter through a basic
introductory exercise, the concept will be introduced through a short
survey of it¹s history as well as theoretical and practical elements,
e.g. presenting some finished mind-maps on various topics. Having done
so, some time should remain for the participants to make some first
steps into mind-mapping in order to see the potential use of this technique
for specific forms of philosophical practice, like counselling sessions,
Socratic dialogues, corporate philosophy and philosophy with children.
Whiteboards and Flipcharts being the classic tools for mind-mapping
we will also introduce software solutions to handle this technique for
both Apple and PC platforms. Hopefully the whole workshop will be recorded
itself as a mindmap in order to underline the power if this technical
tool in philosophical practice as well as many other fields of human
investigation.
The intention is to re-evaluate mind-mapping as
a technique for philosophical practice in general. Most often seen as
an inner dialogue or as a mere brainstorming (mostly hypothetical) tool,
mind-mapping reveals to be more and can even be seen as a genuine philosophical
technique of recording thinking.
The second part of the workshop deals with creative
writing. Through the work of Lutz v. Werder (and others) we will examine
and practice creative writing in philosophical counselling. We will
start with a short historical and theoretical introduction on the subject-matter.
English translations of two of his texts will be available at the conference.
By practising creative-writing on one text, we will discuss the pros
and cons of this method, especially in regard to philosophical counselling
and the philo-cafés.
Creative writing reveals to be not only a technique
but also a method to apply in philosophical practice, especially in
a single client counselling situation.
Most likely the workshop will finish on a general
discussion on the last issue, the concept of creative writing.
The workshop is primarily intended for experienced
philosophical counsellors but stays open to anybody interested.
Generally speaking the presentation will take into
account more than a year¹s work of experience with both mind-mapping
and creative-writing the following fields: philosophical counselling,
media presentations like interviews both on radio and tv, as well as
philosophy with children as a playground for experiments concerning
the two main ideas
Roger Sutcliffe
Workshop on Philosophical Enquiry with Children - a simulation
The workshop's title "Philosophical Enquiry with
Children - a simulation" is self-explanatory. At the start there will
be a brief introduction to the history and principles of 'Philosophy
for Children', followed by an invitation to the participants to engage
in an enquiry along the lines used in classrooms. As in the classroom,
a philosophical story will provide the stimulus for the enquiry, but
participants will not be expected to play the role of children. The
purpose of the exercise will be to show how teachers can set up a 'community
of enquiry', in which children and adults alike can give play to their
sense of wonder, whilst practising the discipline of thinking well together.
Time will be allowed at the end for questions of practice and principle,
based on the experience, albeit limited, of 'doing' an enquiry.
Richard Anthone
Philosophical Inquiry With Children And The Internet Past
Experiments And Future Projects
Philosophical Inquiry with children
isn't that new anymore. There is - so to speak - a certain relevant
practice of doing philosophy with children throughout the world. On
the other hand there is the omnipresent Internet. Disliked by many and
considered as the new and promising future by many others (Bill Gates).
But what of the combination of both? Can PWC be related to the actual
possibilities of the Internet.
The author has set up (in collaboration
with Averbode Publishers and DG XXII of The E.C.) on two occasions a
promising project in that area:
The Philosophy Hotel (1997) during
the European Netd@ys with schools in four countries (four languages).
The Philosophy Hotel (1998) in
the same context and with the same partners but with new technical events
such as live streaming video, audio and with simultaneous translation.
Based on this experience we developed
a new project called: EXPLORIAN. This project will start in September
this year in two languages. What is this project about? Well, suppose
the earth received a visit from an extraterrestrial. Unlike the popular
science fiction stories they would be hosted in a space station that
would be circling around the earth, because they want to know (study)
us better. The idea is that children have to explain to these creatures
what our world is about. In fact this means a gigantic study project
conducted by children and all this via the Internet. The space station
will consist of 6 modules. The most important one (which connects all
the other modules) is the philosophy module. The other modules would
deal with history, technology, society and culture, space and nature.
The children can put the results of their study projects on the Internet,
the E-T can react, comment and so on, but also other classrooms can
react, build on and so forth.
To be precise: this project will
start in September in two languages (Dutch and French), but the idea
is that other languages would follow depending on the success to it
(it is also commercial, I mean schools would have to pay for it).
Explorian will have three ways
of access:
Kids space: this means the
space where children can write down the results of their investigation,
where they can react to one another, ask questions etc. But it contains
also explanation (for my case the philosophy part) about certain philosophical
questions (the old ones), some short stories and topics to start reflections
and discussions, discussion plans and exercises.
Teacher space: contains a brief
introduction on p4c, its method, ways of proceeding, how to manage discussions,
discussion plans etc. In fact this is where Wendy was talking about
a short course on P4C.
Expert space: children can ask
help from experts. Those are philosophers (academic), scientists, whatever.
It is also foreseen that the results of this gigantic study project
will be published in children magazines.
The target age group of Explorian
will be 10 - 14 years. I will elaborate and comment on the past projects,
explain more about aspects of the Explorian Project and I will elaborate
also on another experiment during the upcoming international conference
(September 1999) on Fertility (Leuven, Belgium) where I will conduct
a philosophical session with young people in Europe through videoconferencing
on the ethical aspects of fertility.
David Arnaud
Euthanasia: From Discussion To Dialogue
The workshop will be divided into
two sections. The first section will be a dialogue about euthanasia
focused through one particular case, the second a dialogue about this
dialogue.
Discussions of practical ethical
issues are often characterised by a tendency to degenerate into attack
and counter-attack from already fixed positions rather than being a
genuine investigation of the issues involved. This tendency is quite
possibly due to such factors as the failure to focus upon actual cases
(and instead retreat into vague abstraction), the failure to hear and
accurately respond to what other people are saying, and the failure
to take a genuinely questioning and investigative approach to one's
own presuppositions.
The workshop will present a method
which will hopefully circumvent some of these problems. The dialogue
will focus around a real case. Thomas Creedon is a two year old boy.
His parents believe that his life is not worth living, and indeed consists
solely of suffering, and would prefer him to be dead. The social services
are aware that Thomas' parents would prefer Thomas to be dead and are
considering taking him into care. Thomas is incapable of taking in food
through his mouth and is instead fed by a tube going directly into his
stomach. The law currently makes a distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary treatment, on the basis of the kind of treatment it is,
and prescribes that in the case of extraordinary, but not ordinary treatment,
the treatment can be withdrawn with the result that the person will
die. Thomas' treatment is classified as ordinary treatment so it is
illegal to stop the supply of nutrition going into his stomach. Thomas
Creedon's parents are going to court to challenge the distinction between
ordinary and extraordinary treatment, with, they hope, the outcome that
Thomas' food supply can be cut off and he will die. The problem confronting
the participants in the dialogue is to decide what should be done in
the case of Thomas Creedon. In other words they have to imagine themselves
as the judges in this case with the authority and obligation to decide
whether Thomas should live or die.
The structure of the dialogue
is as follows, although time constraints will mean in this workshop
a shortcutting of some of these stages. First rules for the dialogue
and their justification, standard to Philosophy with Children and Socratic
Dialogue, are presented to the group and left posted upon the wall.
Second, the participants initial thoughts and their justifications about
euthanasia are elicited and recorded for comparison with what they later
come to decide about Thomas. Third material about the life of Thomas
is read by the participants and, rather than being immediately asked
what they think about the case, the participants are asked to frame
questions about Thomas which are then investigated as a group. Next
participants read about the distinction in the law between ordinary
and extraordinary treatment and again questions are framed and investigated
by the group. The freeing up of thought is continued by asking the participants
to think up any factors which might be relevant in coming to a decision
about Thomas. Now that the groundwork of moving from ready-made answers
to a questioning attitude has been completed, and the details of the
case are clear, the participants are in a better position to move into
the taxing part of the dialogue - deciding what should be done about
Thomas. It is stressed that participants, taking the role of judges,
must come to some conclusion - they cannot take the easy way out and
duck the question - that they should strive for consensus, and that
they should remember (if this hasn't already emerged in discussion)
that as judges their decision will affect not just Thomas but will set
a precedent for how other cases are decided. The focus in the dialogue
is maintained by both having a clear case to work around that stops
easy retreat into vague abstraction and by working through issues that
the group have already identified through the question generating procedure.
Once a decision has been reached the participants can reflect back upon
their initial thoughts about euthanasia to see to what extent their
views have either changed or deepened.
Jon Borowicz
Dialogical Uses Of Metaphor
Pragmatism’s renaissance fortuitously
coincides with the emergence of philosophical practice. As pragmatism’s
melioristic approach to self accords well with philosophical practice’s
ideal of life lived fully and well, pragmatism offers a sympathetic
perspective from which one may be philosophical practice both concretely
and theoretically.
If pragmatism is an approach
to the theory and practice of living well, a turn occurs within the
pragmatic tradition in philosophical practice’s concern with talking
the self-improvement of the other as one’s end. What is the pragmatic
use of dialogue? What is the instrumental potential of conversation
for the self-understanding and consequent self-improvement of the other?
In the paper I will answer these questions by way of a liberal use of
elements of the theory of metaphor advanced by Lakoff and Johnson in
Metaphors we Live By. Specifically I will take up the challenge
posed by their remark:
[I]t is by no means an easy
matter to change the metaphors we live by. It is one thing to be
aware of the possibilities inherent in the CHEMICAL metaphor [say],
but it is a very different and far more difficult thing to live
by it.
Due to the paper’s constraints
and consistent with pragmatic method, I will not evaluate Lakoff and
Johnson’s arguments, but will accept them for the sake of demonstrating
the utility of metaphor as a fundamental device of philosophical practice.
What makes it difficult to
change the metaphors we live by? According to Lakoff and Johnson, far
from being merely figurative literary devices, metaphors structure our
conceptual systems. Metaphors, on this view, have entailments which
can be shown to both reveal and hide various aspects of our experience.
How wee experience the world is a function of these embedded metaphors.
Because these patterns are overwhelmingly habitual, the difficulty of
changing metaphors is largely , if not exclusively, the difficulty of
changing habits.
The
paper’s focus will be the use of philosophical dialogue in change of
metaphors. Following Lakoff and Johnson in their use of ‘understanding,
I will argue that, as understanding occurs independently of out awareness
of it, we change our understanding even in bringing it to our awareness.
In consideration of the work of G H Mead, I will argue that dialogue
is conceptually prior to both individual thought and action. Dialogue
being the manipulation of symbols, is a substitute for the manipulation
of physical objects. This section of the paper will be guided by an
explication of the following remarkable passage in Mead.
Control in intelligent conduct
takes place through attentive selection of stimulation’s. There
is no direct control of the response. Control is secured through
the finding and emphasising of the appropriate stimuli in their
relation to one another.
Control, then is exercised in the
manner by which one conceives an action, overt action being merely
effect. Control of metaphor, to the extent that it structures our thought,
ultimately determines our experience. The relative efficiency and flexibility
of dialogue as a form of action makes it effective as a means of melioristic
change of habits of mind and overt action.
Ample working out of metaphors which might arise
in dialogue with visitors will occur throughout the paper.
Ida Jongsma
And Dorine Bauduin
Philosophy In Business: For Better Or For Worse?
This lecture will explore the usefulness and applicability of methods
of practical philosophy in profit and non-profit organisations. Goals
of these methods can be; team building, reflection on own experience,
insight in the relation between theoretical assumptions and daily practice.
The lecture will also consider some exercises which will feature in
the related workshop.
Warren Shibles
Philosophical Practice And Emotion
Neither philosophers nor Philosophical
Counsellors have shown much or any understanding or knowledge of emotion.
Emotions are not taught in the schools at any level, and the literature
on Philosophical Counselling reflects this omission. My argument is
that if philosophy and Philosophical Counselling are going to have any
credibility or practical value, they must include the education of the
emotions. Armed with a knowledge of this area, the philosopher and Philosophical
Counsellor can educate both themselves and their clients, not only about
emotions in general, but about particular emotions as well. Emotions
are such a central feature of our lives and personalities that without
a knowledge of them Philosophical Counselling appears both negligent
and deficient. Emotions can no longer be left out of the philosophical
equation. Dealing with emotion also goes a long way towards making philosophy
more practical, more adequate, and more humanistic.
My paper will deal primarily
with the cognitive theory of emotion, looking at the ideas of people
as widely separated in time as Albert Ellis and Zeno of Citium. The
cognitive theory of emotion may be briefly summarised in the following
points:
1 Emotion is not just a bodily
feeling. Instead say ‘I think-feel emotion.’
2 Emotion is cognition which
causes bodily feeling.
3 The emotive cognition is typically
a value assessment.
4 Emotion can be changed by
changing the cognition. We cause our own emotions.
5 Emotion is not innate or unalterable.
Personality can be radically changed.
6 We cannot have exactly the
same emotion twice, as both cognition and bodily feeling change.
7 Negative emotions such as
anger are due to faulty assessments such as:
-
a failure to accept reality
-
a failure to understand that we can only
do that which is within our power
-
a misuse of value terms, such as thinking
that something is bad in itself.
8 Emotion is not the sort of
(mentalistic) thing that can be ‘released’. (We are wrongly told to
‘release’ our anger, grief, jealousy.)
9 Emotion as such is not a cause
of behaviour. Only cognition leading to bodily feeling can be a cause.
10 Because a judgement or statement
is cognition plus feelings, any statement may be judged or regarded
as an emotion.
11 There are metaemotions, such
as emotion about emotion, or enjoyment of emotion.
Wieger Van
Dalen
It Isn’t Funny But There’s A Lot
Of Laughter: The Role Of Humour In Socratic Dialogue
This workshop aims at a better
understanding and use of the rhetorics of humour by facilitators in
their dialogues. Socratic Dialogue without outbursts of laughter is
considered to be a failure. This is not because humour is an important
path to insight. It is not.
In a Socratic Dialogue the frames
of reference of the participants are at stake. Every moment it is possible
that your ideas become untrue. This putting of your convictions at stake,
is a daring undertaking to which there will be psychological barriers.
Laughter is supposed to be a reaction to a sudden change in the frame
of reference. In the Socratic Dialogue we are investigating these frames
of reference. This investigation might also result in a change of frame
of reference.
It is the facilitator’s opinion
that when there is no laughter in a Dialogue, it is a sign we haven’t
been close enough to the frames of reference to be able to investigate
them. In that case the Dialogue results in a sort of cognitive game
about possible solutions to possible (hypothetical) problems. Moreover,
humour can also be a means of tackling the psychological barriers to
the changes in convictions.
The role of humour in the Socratic
dialogue then is twofold:
1) it gives the participants
and the facilitator insight in the frames of reference which
are really at stake
2) it gives the facilitator
and the participants the possibility to handle and solve possible
psycho-sociological tensions in the group.
The workshop will take the following
course:
-
First we will use case material to analyse
the ethos, pathos and logos of humour. This is done aiming at a
better understanding of the rhetorics of humour.
-
Secondly we will try to practice ourselves
in using humour in a dialogue. This will be done with the American
point of view: dare to make mistakes and learn from them.
-
Third we will have a look at frames of reference
at stake in humour used in the first two steps. Main question in
this point will be what does it mean for the facilitator, what can
he do with it in his/her role?
And finally the do’s and don’ts
of humour will be discussed.
Nigel W Laurie,
MA, MA, CMC, FCMC, MCIM, MIMgt
Management Learning Through Dialogue:
A Concrete Case
"The learning organisation" is a phrase on the
lips of almost every manager today. And yet achieving organisational
learning remains difficult. In this session a management philosopher
and consultant with over 20 years experience presents a case study of
effective management learning through dialogue. Nigel Laurie will describe
the approach he took drawing on the socratic tradition and the 20th
century approaches inspired by it. He explains the context of the dialogue
he designed and facilitated in a large international organisation. He
defines its objectives, format, structure and ground rules. The central
role of the concrete experience of participants is discussed and this
is related to Kolb's learning cycle theory. The key learning goals are
specified: to ground theory in experience, to strengthen the group's
ability to go on learning together, and to stimulate the continuing
practice of reflective leadership.
He describes in detail the dialogue content and
the conclusions reached. He reports on the participants' immediate reactions,
what was learnt and how it related to academic and research-based knowledge
about organisations. He indicates how reflections on concrete experience
can align with often-neglected theory and enrich understanding of it
- in this case about the need for authority in organisations and the
roles it plays. And he suggests how the limitations of concrete experience
can be transcended and understanding refined by 'experience from elsewhere',
in this case of the possibility and nature of self-managed teams. Finally
he offers some observations about the impact of dialogue in organisations
and how managers can use it to enhance organisational performance.
 Copyright Nigel W Laurie 1999
The old-timers - Jess Fleming & Dries Boele
Jess Fleming:
"My first observation is that while quite a lot of old-timers who
have been attending the conferences since the first one in Vancouver
in 1994 were at the conference in Oxford - for example Lydia Amir, Jon
Borowiscz, Dries Boele, Stanley Chan, Jos Delnoij, Ora Gruengard, Ida
Jongsma, Anders Lindseth, Lou Marinoff, Petra von Morstein, Anette Prins,
Shlomit Schuster, Eite Veening, and myself (I have attended all five:
Vancouver, Amsterdam, New York, Bensberg & Oxford), there were of course
a lot of new and relatively new-comers such as John McHugh, Warren Shibles,
the growing Norwegian contingency, and too many others to mention here,
there were also some old-timers missing, for example, Gerd Achenbach
(and other, younger, Germans such as Michael Schefczyk, and Patrick
Neubauer), as well as the Israelis Rachel Blass and Ran Lahav, and my
North American colleagues, Ken Cust, Paul Sharkey, James Tuedio, and
David Jopli ng, just to name a few. On the one hand it is encouraging
that so many people are becoming interested in philosophical counselling
& philosophical practice, but on the other hand, I think it is regrettable
that so many who have taken a leading role in the past didn't make it
this time for whatever reason. Above all, I regret that my good friend
and colleague, Vaughana Feary, couldn't come due to her serious illness.
Vaughana's intelligence, kind-heartedness, and big smile were missed
by many who know her, not to mention her articulate and civil voice
in all matters concerning philosophical counselling. As always, I heard
a lot of discussion about the pros and cons regarding certification
and licensing; at least this time (unlike the past two conferences)
the discussion was generally civil and rational, rather than vitriolic
and emotional. There has always been the question what, if any, academic
training in philosophy (or "philosophical counselling") should be required
of someone thinking of practising philosophical counselling. I personally
think that Ernesto Spinelli is right (in Demystifying Therapy) that
it is the counsellor's "way of being" in the world, rather than any
theoretical orientation or training, which is crucial. Being-with colleagues
such as Vaughana, Ida, Dries, Lydia, Anders, and Will Heutz makes me
think that it is indeed how one lives out one's life, rather than what
one says, which makes the difference. Hence, I myself, always enjoy
the social side of these gatherings, partly in the hope that the goodness
and wisdom of others will somehow rub off on me. I continue to be pleased
that more and more people see the obvious value of Asian philosophy
in philosophical counselling, and am pleasantly surprised to overhear
people speaking of Zen Buddhism, Taoism, and so forth. In my own talks
I have always tried to say and show the importance of humour and irony,
and I am glad that I saw and heard a lot of people trying to be funny.
In regard to how the Oxford conference differed from others in the past,
I think Karin Murris, Elizabeth Aylward,Trevor Curnow, et al. did a
fine job, and especially appreciate two things which I think should
be continued at all future conferences: 1. Distributing the papers in
advance so we can read them and then focus on discussion and dialogue,
and 2. Holding actual counselling sessions so we can really see how
others handle clients and their problems. I was also intrigued by the
talks on philosophy for children, which I don't know much about, and
which has not been (to my recollection) included in our past conferences.
I think Emmy van-Deurzen's talk was very well received, and I myself
always get a real kick out of hearing her speak, or perhaps I should
say being in her presence while she recounts her own experiences as
an existential counsellor. She is another good example of someone whose
presence can be inspiring and encouraging, with her wit and candour.
I thought her talk was an excellent way to bring the conference to a
conclusion. The post-conference business meeting was conducted in a
cordial and co-operative manner, I thought, and I'm happy that Ted (Welch)
agreed to do the NIPP networking for us all, and that the Norwegians
will host the next conference, but I personally wish we could have decided
to meet yearly as usual, rather than wait two years for the next get-together.
Next time I look forward to seeing my old friends, my new friends, and
making other new friends."
Dries Boele
"What I first of all liked very much was the combination of a beautiful
location (University and Oxford), good weather, nice people (many of
them I have met at other International conferences), interesting lectures
and workshops and the bar life in the evening (it was very nice that
we could stay outside the conference building; in New York for example
we had to go somewhere else. It will be this combination that I will
remember. Interesting was the contrast with the conference in Germany
last year. Many lectures then were boring, especially the keynote speakers,
because they didn't know how to present their lecture (all read) and
often these speakers were university professors who didn't have a clue
what practical philosophy was, but nevertheless they thought they had
the right to say everything about it. Very irritating. This was not
the case in Oxford. Most keynote speakers were philosophical practitioners
themselves and the others had an interesting presentation (I am thinking
here of Richard Smith and Eulalia Bosch who were both excellent). On
the negative side, the cafe philo was a flop. I had dinner then with
some non-philosophers who said that all their prejudices concerning
philosophy and philosophers were confirmed by this 'show'. Some workshops
were good (interesting views and experiences), others bad (especially
the presentation). It was a pity that the idea of texts available beforehand
so that we could discuss more and more precisely, didn't work at all.
I turned my workshop into a discussion with that idea in mind, but I
found I couldn't rely on people having read my text. There were also
too many workshops at the same time for my liking, but it was not possible
to organise it otherwise. What I liked was the absence of discussions
about the difference between philosophical counselling and psychotherapy
(at least in the lectures and workshops I attended.) At the other conferences
this was often an issue. I liked as well the presence of different forms
of philosophical practice: counselling, socratic dialogue, philosophy
with children, dilemma training, philosophy in business. This was also
different from Germany. Three years ago in Leusden, Holland, we had
the same formula: the model being the philosophical practitioner who
often combines several practices if he wants to earn his or her money
with it. I think the international meeting at the end was a success,
despite the heated debates sometimes (I know I contributed to it as
well). I am glad that we initiated the NIPP. I think it is a good instrument
to discuss and to stay in contact with each other. (I hope it will not
deteriorate...) Important for me is as well that the NIPP is not connected
with a society or association in particular. (I hope this will be respected
in the future.) I hope also that we will have a small study conference
next year, on a special theme, somewhere in Greece, France or in the
Transsiberian express. I already have some ideas for it. One or more
such small conference will satisfy other needs than a big International
Conference. Both are interesting and necessary. For me a big International
Conference has to offer the opportunity for everybody to present his
or her research, what they discovered and explored since the last conference.
For me the conference in Oxford was such a conference! A study conference
has another purpose, can be more specialised, with only people who like
the subject. When I compare the Oxford conference with the previous
ones, I still see a lot of development. I like that. It keeps philosophical
practice a fresh and renewing movement. I hope it will take a long time
before it becomes established with its elite of respected fossils and
its sanctuary for its pioneers and all such horrible stuff. In every
country where the conference is held, it means an enormous impulse for
the development of philosophical practice in that particular country.
Karin Murris did a very good job. I know others helped a lot, but I
think her energy and will were indispensable. I like very much the absence
of politics at the conference. In New York and in Bensberg politics
spoilt the atmosphere: societies and individuals trying to gain influence
-secret networks and meetings, etc. Maybe we have left that behind us.
(I am not sure, but well, let's hope.)"
The first-timers : Lucy Traves & Ted Welch
Lucy Traves:
"At first, the conference was a very strange experience for me. To
be back in Oxford again (where I studied for my first degree) attending
lectures and seminars, but without the strain of essays and tutorials,
it seemed like some days out of time. It was like going back to my first
few weeks at University. Here was a huge pile of people, more than I
could have possibly imagined, who were interested and fired by the same
issues as me. Some had known each other for some time (like 2nd and
3rd years) and there was the feeling of conversations, dialogues that
had been going on for some time before my arrival. As an English speaker,
with precious few language skills, I was put to shame by other attendees.
I find it difficult enough to find the precise words to convey what
I want to say in seminars at the best of times - and I was speaking
about this with someone, who said "yes, indeed, English is my fourth
language - and sometimes it can be hard". So, a big thank you to everyone
for carrying proceedings on in English ! Like many others I was most
disappointed that Gerd Achenbach couldn't make it. The lack of good
translations of his papers means that I feel that I haven't been able
to get a sufficient grip on his thought - and that thought informs the
work of so many people I met and admired at conference, so I feel a
huge lack. However, there were so many excellent seminars and lectures
that I didn't weep for too long. I was going to write that the main
lack that I felt was that of practical work - but looking at my notes
perhaps this isn't as true as I had thought. In parallel session 2,
I went to Anette Prins 'Philosophical Exercises'. It was a very fun
session to attend, as well as our minds moving, we had to move and interact
with each other, I await Anette's book with much impatience. In parallel
session 4, Stanley Chan discussed how he uses different concepts of
time with the terminally ill. Although, this was 'chalk and talk' (in
this case some very well prepared slides) - I felt that this really
got to the nub of things. Rather than speaking about how one should
'do' philosophical counselling, Stanley spoke about what he actually
'did' . When I have spoken to friends about philosophical counselling,
many have asked me, how can speech using abstract concepts actually
'help' people ? I realise that there is some debate about whether philosophical
counsellors should think of themselves in that way, but Stanley's talk
was a good demonstration of the effects of philosophical counselling
on a person's life. Ida Jongsma, Dorine Bauduin, Richard Smith and Will
Heutz all spoke about the use of philosophy in a business context. I
found it fascinating to contrast their different perspectives - each
of them conjured up a picture of a rider in the circus pounding around
the ring with a foot on one horse and one foot on another. I especially
enjoyed Will Heutz as I felt that he rather gave of himself. Another
lecture that gave me the same experience was that of Eulalia Bosch 'A
Philosophical Approach to Contemporary Art'. I could have listened to
her for far, far longer. I'm very much looking forward to the next conference
- and I'm determined to brush up my languages ! "
Ted Welch:
"There were participants from more than 20 countries, although there
were only about 150 people. The small scale meant that people did not
tend to fragment into specialised cliques, as seems to have happened
in the recent philosophy conference in Boston with its 3,500 participants.
The human scale was echoed by the venue, Wadham College, Oxford. This
rather idyllic setting, with tree-shaded lawns was made even more pleasant
by hot, sunny weather. The conference consisted of a number of plenary
sessions and sets of parallel sessions which were either talks or workshops.
Some main themes were the nature and uses of dialogue and the uses of
philosophy in counselling, consultancy and education. Talks included
such titles as: "Prozac vs Plato," "Philosophical counselling and Chuang
Tzu's philosophy of love" and "Dialogical uses of metaphor." Workshops
included: "Creative writing and mind-mapping", "Dialogue and multi-cultural
issues" and "Philosophical questions in Organisations." It was also
the possible to book a personal philosophy counselling session. The
first plenary session was "Error, not Truth?" a presentation by Joanna
Haynes and Karin Murris. It began with the showing of a video of children
(about 9 years old) discussing their views on philosophy. This led to
the reading of a dialogue between Joanna and Karin about the video.
The dialogue had originally taken place via e-mail. Karin said that
in thinking about the issues between getting e-mails, she had developed
ideas about how she wanted the dialogue to go. However she had realised
she hadn't really entering been into the spirit of the dialogue and
so tried to be more open to the way the dialogue between them developed.
This self-reflection about the process of philosophising, particularly
through dialogue, was echoed in a workshop on philosophy in management
consulting. This workshop was called: "Reflection in Action: Creating
a reflective space in management consulting." The introductory part
involved getting our reactions to a text with a little speech by a middle-manager
to an employee. We were asked to comment on this and our comments were
written up on a flip-chart. These comments were very critical; apparently
these initial comments are almost always negative and there is a kind
of avalanche effect as people echo the tone of the first comments. We
were then asked to imagine that the person we'd been criticising came
in and saw our comments. This led people to reflect on what they'd said
and acknowledge that their comments could be seen as hasty and unfair.
Ruud Meij, one of the workshop leaders, explained the underlying approach
and theories behind the exercises. They feel that their approach is
not merely of relevance in management consulting: "We think that our
approach in creating a reflective practice as philosophers engaged in
management consulting is of importance for every philosopher." Given
the way many of the philosophers in the group had had to rapidly revise
their initial responses to the first exercise, Boers and Meij have a
point. Warren Shibles' talk "Philosophical Practice and Emotion" was
a further example of reflective practice; it involved radical questioning
of some of the basic assumptions underlying philosophy in practice.
He pointed out that there was a focus on a very restricted range of
philosophers, a great emphasis on Socrates, but very varied interpretations
of what Socratic dialogue was. One talk was about the value of web sites,
particularly for teaching philosophy to children. Richard Anthone (from
Belgium) has worked on the Philosophy Hotel during the European Netd@ys
with schools in four countries - and four languages - in 1997 and the
Philosophy Hotel in 1998 with new technical events such as streaming
video, audio and with simultaneous translation. The next project is
even more ambitious. According to Richard : "Explorian will start in
September this year...children have to explain to aliens what our world
is about. In fact this means a gigantic study project conducted by children
and all this via the Internet." It was good to see someone using the
new technology in this imaginative way to get children thinking about
some ancient questions. An important aspect of the conference was the
informal discussion that took place on Wadham's lawns, on the terrace
of the college bar and in some of Oxford's fine pubs. At the last plenary
session participants expressed a desire to keep in touch and continue
the discussions. It was decided to set up the Network of International
Philosophy in Practice (NIPP) and a mailing list (see below for details)
(Some of) The organisers : Trevor Curnow & Elizabeth
Aylward
Trevor Curnow:
"On the basis of, 'If you can do it once you can do it again' (if
only that were true of every area of life!), I have been asked to write
a report for Practical Philosophy on the Oxford conference, just as
I produced one on Bensberg last year. However, certain significant differences
obtain. I went to Bensberg as something of a wide-eyed neophyte in philosophical
counselling circles, and attended a substantial number of the sessions
on offer. A year later, though not noticeably wiser, I attended Oxford
as one of the conference organisers, and only managed to get to one
parallel session apart from my own. This year's report is therefore
significantly more anecdotal and more reliant on second-hand experiences.
To begin with the basics. Oxford proved an inspired choice of location,
the weather exceeded anyone's expectations, and the staff of the college
bar were of the highest calibre. A decision was made at an early stage
of the conference planning that it would provide a forum not only for
those interested in philosophical counselling, but also for those involved
in the areas of philosophy for children and philosophy in business.
As a result, there was a very varied programme on offer, and many took
the opportunity of exploring areas of philosophical practice which were
not normally their own. Another decision which was taken at a very early
stage was to provide as much time as possible within the programmed
sessions for discussion or practical workshop activities. To this end,
as many materials as possible, in as full a form as possible, were circulated
in advance. Although this necessitated a considerable amount of work,
the experiment generally proved to be popular. The result was that those
who gave papers usually only needed to introduce them, and discussions
could focus on the areas participants found to be of particular interest.
In the case of workshops, participants had a good idea as to what was
an offer and were better able to make informed choices. This was particularly
helpful given that we had to operate with a split site. Even with plenary
sessions, there was generally far more discussion and/or participation
than is common at conferences. As always, discussions bring out differences
of opinion as well as agreements. Putting 150 philosophers into a limited
space can hardly be expected to yield anything else. Two fundamental
issues merged more than once. First, as ever, there were debates over
the nature of philosophy itself, and the significance of the divisions
within it. Secondly, and relatedly, there were conflicting views over
what it was that philosophy had to offer in the different areas under
consideration. Many of the points of contention were crystallised by
Eite Veening in his plenary contribution, with his characterisation
of the Platonist and Aristotelian approaches to philosophy, and what
they had to offer. Given the fact that this particular pair of terms
is now well into its third millennium of usage, it will come as no surprise
that no obvious consensus emerged. After some of the mind-numbing (i.e.
incomprehensible), ear-numbing (i.e. for those of us relying on headphones
for the interpreter's services), and buttock-numbing (i.e. too long)
plenary sessions at Bensberg last year, one of the pleasures this year
was the variety of plenary presentations on offer. For example, Ida
Jongsma and Dorine Baudoin showed that even after a long day and a decent
dinner, you can still get an audience actively involved, and Eulalia
Bosch sought to open our eyes to the density of meanings of visual images.
In the sessions I attended, there was generally a level of liveliness
on offer which I do not normally associate with the formal sessions
of conferences. Given that the ethos of a conference is as much established
by what goes on outside the formal sessions as what goes on within them,
it is pleasing to report that a general spirit of harmony prevailed,
from the meditation-inspired tranquillity of the early morning to the
alcohol-induced bonhomie of the very early morning. Thanks to Lia Keuchenius,
Arthur Guinness et al! One of the memories of the conference which will
linger for a while is of a substantial number of delegates being despatched
from outside the long-closed bar by an irate porter who had received
complaints about the noise from students! And we really were discussing
philosophical issues! Some headed into the city to carry on their debates
at an alternative venue. Having had some involvement with the organisation
of the conference, I am aware of how much work was put into it by two
people in particular, namely Karin Murris and Elizabeth Aylward, without
whom it really would not have happened. Both for the planning of the
whole enterprise and for their day to day management of the details
of it, they wholly deserve the immense gratitude of all who attended.
To end on an anecdote, my own abiding memory of the conference is of
trips to an Oxford bank with wads of bank-notes stuffed into pockets,
as an unexpectedly large number of delegates settled their accounts
in cash. After the third such trip I felt I had to explain to the cashier
(it always seemed to be the same one) that just because I kept coming
in with large wads of cash, that did not mean that I was dealing in
drugs! Had she been of a logical bent, she could have pointed out that
it also did not mean that I was not dealing in drugs. It may be a good
thing that not everybody studies philosophy?"
Elizabeth Aylward:
"My impressions of the conference were many and various; the perfect
weather, delight with my room at Wadham; wisteria clad and in the Bursars
quad which meant easy access to everything, relief that all the books
had arrived as promised, fear that we would not sell any and I would
have to go crawling back to the suppliers, the almost overwhelming pressure
of enrolment shared with Tim, exasperation at not knowing answers to
some of the queries, relief that we had prepared a badge for every delegate,
the early morning quiet on my trips down to Keble, only the sun up ,
another lone figure strolling round the quad, a furtive backpacker sneaking
down one of the stair ways.; admiration for Nigel's ability to speak
clearly and informally at a moment's notice as he did at the Sheriff's
reception, the mad dash with Karin back to Wadham immediately after
the speeches, to try to deal with problems, trying each day to avoid
the porters and Bursar who greeted me with "AH!" and a list of problems
the moment they saw me, lugging the loads of books each day to the Okinaga
corridor, hoping they would be lighter on the return journey, gratitude
to Susan, Mary , David and Maria without whose help we should not have
managed, after midnight checkings of numbers and money, the incredible
din from the bar, appreciating Trevor's support and numerous trips to
the Bank, frustration at not having time to stop and chat during coffee
and lunch breaks, frustration again at only hearing bits of lectures,
grateful for having the chance to meet our advertisers, especially the
four ladies from Tangram, who were all fascinating to talk to, relief
at the arrival of the photographer and at the way she did her job and
the delight on the delegates faces when they saw the results next day,
the blur of the AGM where we were all on auto pilot I think, chagrin
at having, throughout the conference, wrongly directed delegates who
asked for the New Seminar room, a lasting impression of a wonderful
performance of Macbeth in a perfect setting, being unable to sleep on
Tuesday and Wednesday nights in case I forgot something and then blotto
on Thursday night after ( faint) feelings of regret that it was all
nearly over, grateful to have heard most of Dr. Stanley Chan's lecture
and question session, which was personally helpful to me, sorry not
to have the chance to talk to him further, horror at being so unfit
that it was a major operation to climb into a space on the refractory
benches, the patience of the kitchen staff who found extra meals for
those for who one was not enough and who allowed the photographer to
disrupt the conference dinner, the taste of a long glass of ice cold
lemonade handed to me after an extremely hot afternoon with our visiting
reporter, the final International Forum, where there was an amazing
enthusiasm and atmosphere even though everyone was exhausted, euphoria
at the sight of the coach, an hour late, finally arriving at Gloucester
Green for the homeward journey;- altogether although I regret some lost
opportunities, it was overall a wonderful experience to be a part of
such an atmosphere and undertaking and I gained a great deal in terms
of interest, contacts made and lessons learned. "
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